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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the plaintiffs and 
appellees, Harrington Properties, Inc. ("HPI"), Robert L. Harrington ("Harrington"), and Jane R. 
Harrington hereby petition the Court for a rehearing in this matter. As set forth below, on the 
key point of whether additional loans were secured by an earlier deed of trust between the 
parties, the Court's opinion, which was filed on November 27, 1998, is predicated specifically on 
the Court's misapprehension of two facts critical to its holding and on a misapprehension of the 
actual language of the trust deed. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This appeal arises from HPI's purchase of a residential building lot from 
Marilyn Peterson ("Peterson"). Mrs. Peterson sold the lot to HPI pursuant to a promissory note 
that was secured by a second-position trust deed (the "Trust Deed") on the property. The 
principal question before this Court on appeal was whether on motion for partial summary 
judgment the district court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, certain additional loans by 
Mrs. Peterson were not secured by the Trust Deed because they were not evidenced by a 
promissory note reciting that they were secured by that Trust Deed. 
Harrington's motion for partial summary judgment sought a declaration that the monies 
advanced by Peterson in and after February 1993 were not secured by the 1991 Trust Deed 
because there was no writing evidencing such a securitization as required by clause (3) of the 
Trust Deed. In partial response to the summary judgment motion, Peterson argued that 
$4,898.81 of the advances was secured by paragraph 5 of the Trust Deed because it represented 
funds paid directly to Guardian State Bank for interest due on the note secured by the first-place 
1 
As a matter of undisputed fact in the record, no part of the loans at issue on appeal was 
used to pay any encumbrance, charge, or lien. Any such uses of the loans were excluded from 
the Order by the district court. Indeed, on the legal issue, the district court agreed with this 
Court's view of the operation of paragraph 5. 
Except for the $4,898.81 noted above, Peterson did not contend below or on appeal that 
the loans in question paid any encumbrance, charge, or lien. For that reason, Peterson made no 
argument below or on appeal that the district court erred by failing to find that the loans were 
secured by the Trust Deed under clause (2) with reference to paragraph 5. 
Thus, because the Court misapprehended a fact critical to its holding, rehearing is proper. 
2. The Court Misapprended the Reason for the Requested Additional Loans in February 
1993, Thus Warranting a Rehearing. 
In its Opinion, this Court recited as factual background that "[i]n February 1993, 
Peterson, at Harrington's request, made another advance to Harrington of $69,626.84 to ensure 
construction could be completed and to prevent foreclosure of the Guardian Bank construction 
loan." (emphasis added). Opinion at 3. The Court then held that "Peterson advanced the 
construction money to Harrington under these circumstances because the alternative was to allow 
foreclosure of the Property, thereby impairing her own security interest," concluding "[t]hus 
Peterson's 1993 advance to Harrington was made to protect her security interest in the Property." 
Id at 5. 
That conclusion is predicated on a misapprehension of a fact critical to the conclusion. 
As noted above, there was no notice of default to Harrington on the Guardian State Bank note. 
Moreover, Peterson did not contend before the district court or on appeal that Harrington was 
about to default on that Note or that foreclosure was imminent. The Court's misapprehension of 
4 
that fact is therefore fatal to its conclusion quoted above, and for that reason a rehearing is 
warranted. 
3. The Court's Consideration of Dragnet Clause Analysis Was Based on a 
Misapprehension of the Trust Deed's Language. Thus Warranting a Rehearing. 
Because it misapprehended the nature of the additional advances, this Court did not 
correctly analyze the applicability of clause (3) of the Trust Deed except in its analysis 
concerning "dragnet" clauses.2 Opinion at 5. However, this was an incorrect interpretation of 
the Trust Deed and of the requirements in clause (3) for securing additional indebtedness, and a 
misapprehension of the actual language of the Trust Deed. 
A dragnet clause is one which makes real estate security for subsequent additional debts. 
Such clauses typically are drafted with extremely broad language. For example, the dragnet 
clause in the case cited by this Court stated that it was "to secure the payment of any and all 
claims or demands now due or to become due now or hereafter contracted or incurred which the 
said mortgagee or the holder hereof, from time to time, may have or hold against the mortgagors 
or either of them." First Sec. Bank v. Shiew. 609 P.2d 952, 953 (Utah 1980). The question 
before the Utah Supreme Court in Shiew was whether the extremely broad language of the 
dragnet clause in that case was enforceable to secure a subsequent additional debt. The Supreme 
Court held that such clauses would not be enforced unless "'the advances are of the same kind 
and quality or relate to the same transaction'" as the principal obligation or unless '"the document 
evidencing the subsequent advance refers to the mortgage as providing security therefor.'" Id at 
954 (citation omitted). 
While the Court does not identify the specific provision that it believed constitutes a dragnet clause, 
the Court apparently relied on clause (3) because the Court refers to "additional advances". 
5 
Under this authority, a court must make a two-step analysis when analyzing whether 
subsequent advances are secured by a trust deed. First, the court must make the threshold 
determination of whether there is a dragnet clause that purports to cover the subsequent loans. If 
so, the second question is whether the dragnet clause is enforceable under Shiew. 
This Court failed to make the first inquiry. In fact, there is no dragnet clause in the Trust 
Deed, either similar to or functionally equivalent to the provision in Shiew, and this Court does 
not point to one. More importantly, clause 3 in the Trust Deed is in fact an anti-dragnet clause. 
Rather than stating that the trust deed secures all other indebtedness as in Shiew. under clause (3) 
the trust deed secures additional loans only "when evidenced by a promissory note or notes 
reciting that they are secured bv this Deed of Trust." (emphasis added). The absence of any 
dragnet clause and the express contrary language ends the first prong of the Shiew analysis. It 
was therefore unnecessary for the Court to consider the next question of whether the clause 
would be enforceable because the additional advances were "related" to the original loan. Under 
this analysis, the district court correctly held that the monies loaned by Peterson pursuant to the 
February 18 Letter Agreement were not secured by the Trust Deed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reconsider this matter and either affirm the 
declaratory judgment of the district court or grant a rehearing. 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Counsel for the petitioners hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and 
not for delay. 
6 
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James S. Jard 
/ Bfrent D. 
^Eric D. Ba 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the day of December, 1998,1 have caused to be mailed by United 
States mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEES' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING to the following: 
Harold C. Verhaaren, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
440863 




Third J IKJ IC I" P - T ! C ; 
DEC 10 1996 
JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) SALT -" -
ERIC D. BARTON (A6481)
 %. ^ 
RAY, QUINNEY Sc NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 45385 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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HARRINGTON PROPERTIES, INC., : 
a Utah corporation; ROBERT L. 




: Civil No. 940904680CN 
MARILYN HAMILTON PETERSON; and 
GLOBAL MOTOR INNS, a Utah 
corporation, Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Their 
Fourth Cause of Action and Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on for hearing before the Court on November 4, 
1996. Plaintiffs were represented by James S. Jardine. 
Defendants were represented by John K. Mangum. Based upon the 
memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties and the arguments 
of counsel at the hearing, and the orders of the court, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on 
the basis that there remain material issues of fact in dispute. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Fourth Cause of Action of their Third Amended Complaint is 
granted, except for $4,898.81 in funds paid to Guardian State 
Bank. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory 
judgment that monies advanced to Robert L. Harrington and/or 
Harrington Properties, Inc. by defendant Peterson beyond their 
Agreement dated December 8, 1992, and pursuant to an agreement 
made in February, 1993, were not secured by the Deed of Trust, 
dated June 21, 1991, and referred to by the plaintiffs as the 
"Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II", except for $4,898.81 in funds paid 
to Guardian State Bank. 
3, Pursuant to Rule 52(a), the following is a brief 
written statement of the grounds for the Order: 
a. The Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, dated June 21, 
1991, provides in part that it is given for the purpose of 
securing " . . . (3) the payment of such additional loans or 
advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor or his successor or 
assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting 
that they are secured by that deed of trust . . . " Sunset Oaks 
Trust Deed II, p. 2. 
b. The Court finds that the monies advanced by 
defendant Peterson pursuant to the February 18, 1993 letter were 
"additional loans or advances" within the meaning of clause (3), 
and that clause (3) applies to the monies loaned or advanced by 
Peterson pursuant to the February 18, 1993 letter agreement, 
except as to the $4,898.81 paid to Guardian State Bank, which 
2 
payments were secured under clause (2) of the Sunset Oaks Trust 
Deed II by reference to paragraph 5 thereof. 
c. Except as to the $4,898.81 paid to Guardian State 
Bank, the Court finds that clauses (1), (2) and (4) of the Sunset 
Oaks Trust Deed II do not apply to the new advances made after 
those covered by the December 8, 1992 Agreement, as contended by 
defendants, and that the interpretation of those clauses asserted 
by defendants is artificial. 
d. The Court finds that the February 18, 1993 letter 
from Robert L. Harrington to Marilyn Hamilton Peterson is the 
only document which reflects the agreement between the parties 
with respect to the advances made by defendant Peterson after 
those covered by the December 8, 1992 Agreement. The Court does 
not decide whether the February 18, 1993 letter constitutes a 
"promissory note" within the meaning of clause (3) of the Sunset 
Oaks Trust Deed II. The Court does conclude that the 
February 18, 1993 letter does not recite that the monies advanced 
thereunder are secured by Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, as required 
by clause (3). 
DATED this tO day of December, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
inorable Sandra Peu]&r/..,-, \u-~ 
Approved As To Form: 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
£M 
K. Mangum ~^~ 
NIELSEN Sc SENIOR, P.C. 
201345.03 
Exhibit B 
Harold C. Verhaaren, USB No. 3325 
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072 
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60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRINGTON PROPERTIES, INC. a Utah ) 
corporation; ROBERT L. HARRINGTON and ) 
JANE R. HARRINGTON, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v . j 
MARILYN HAMILTON PETERSON; and ] 




PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
i JUDGMENT AND SUPPORTING 
i DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTION 
1 FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
> JUDGMENT 
) (Oral Argument Requested) 
1 Civil No. 940904680 CN 
) Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendants, by and through their undersigned counsel, respectfully submit the following 
Memorandum opposing the Motion of Plaintiffs for Partial Summary Judgment on their Fourth 
Cause of Action of their Third Amended Complaint, which Motion was dated July 17, 1996. 
This Memorandum is also offered in support of the Cross Motion of Defendants for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 




The principal persons to this dispute are a businesswoman without any formal legal 
training (Defendant Marilyn Peterson) and a member of the Utah State Bar (Plaintiff Robert 
Harrington), who agreed to buy a single lot from Mrs. Peterson in an arm's-length credit 
transaction. Mr. Harrington gave Mrs. Peterson a Promissory Note in payment of the full 
purchase price of the lot which was secured by a Purchase Money Trust Deed. Mr. Harrington 
then proceeded on his own, through his closely held corporation, Harrington Properties, Inc., 
to attempt to build a luxury spec home on that property (the "Sunset Oaks Property"). 
Peterson was not, and should not properly be viewed in any way as a joint venturer with 
Harrington. Had Harrington been able to adequately finance the construction project he 
undertook on his own, as he originally projected and represented, Mrs. Peterson would have had 
no further involvement in the transaction, other than to collect payment of her Promissory Note. 
However, Harrington later filed a personal bankruptcy and then lacked the means, contrary to 
his original representations, to complete his undertaking. 
Knowing that Mrs. Peterson had access to substantial sums of money, and apparently 
lacking other ready means of financing, Harrington requested additional funding from 
Mrs. Peterson to complete his original project. Fearing the potential loss of her ability to collect 
the money owed her if the project were not properly completed, Mrs. Peterson obliged and 
advanced the remaining funds necessary to substantially complete the construction of the luxury 
home which Mr. Harrington had already partly built to the point that plans could not easily be 
changed. 
51635 PE8632 10 - 2 -
While the narrow issue presented by Plaintiffs' motion is whether monies loaned in 1993 
by Mrs. Peterson were secured by her Purchase Money Trust Deed of June 1991 (usually 
referred to by Plaintiffs as die Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, because recorded after the trust deed 
securing the construction loan from Guardian State Bank to Harringtons), the resolution of this 
issue is not properly made by looking only at one small phrase of the Purchase Money Trust 
Deed, as Plaintiffs suggest. Mischaracterizing the nature of those 1993 advances as separate and 
unrelated loans, Plaintiffs focus on the only language they can find to support their strained 
interpretation, and totally ignore the multitude of other provisions of the Purchase Money Trust 
Deed which clearly secure, independent of any later writing, the further advances made by 
Mrs. Peterson to complete construction. 
ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Paramount among the material facts which are undisputed, even undisputable, are the 
following provisions of the Purchase Money Trust Deed (the "Trust Deed" or "Deed of Trust"), 
which provides, in relevant part, on page two of that Trust Deed, as follows: 
For the purpose of securing: 
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date in 
the principal sum of $95,000.00, made by Trustor, payable to the order of 
Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest^ therein set forth, and 
any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; 
(2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor fMr. Harringtonl herein 
contained: 
(3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made 
to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or 
notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and 
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(4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary TMrs. Peterson! 
under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein 
provided. 
To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees: 
(1) To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or 
demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore promptly and in good and 
workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or 
destroyed thereon; . . . to do all other acts which from the character or use of 
said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not 
excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part hereof is being 
obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said 
property. Trustor further agrees: 
(a) to commence construction promptly and to pursue 
same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with 
plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) to allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during 
construction. 
(7) Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein 
provided, then Beneficiary or, trustee but without obligation so to do and without 
notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any 
obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent 
as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof, . . . and in 
exercising any such powers., incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its 
absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of 
title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
(8) To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder 
by Beneficiary or trustee, with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of 
percent per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured 
hereby. 
Purchase Money Deed of Trust dated June 21, 1991, at p. 2. [Emphasis added] 
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OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' PURPORTED UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Defendants object to the following numbered paragraphs from Plaintiffs* Memorandum 
which were claimed by Plaintiffs to be undisputed, but which Defendants do in fact dispute: 
Defendants object to the last sentence of paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' statement of claimed 
undisputed facts. Mrs. Peterson did not propose to advance new money for construction, but 
rather agreed to Mr. Harrington's request that she advance such funds. Peterson's Supplemental 
Affidavit at H ' s 20 and 23. 
Defendants object and assert that paragraph 7c of Plaintiffs' statement of claimed 
undisputed facts mischaracterizes the December 8, 1992 Agreement. Paragraph 8 of that 1992 
Agreement reads: M8. Collateral. This Agreement is secured by a Trust Deed dated June 21, 
1991 more particularly referred to in paragraph 1 [Recital "A"] above." Recital "A" more 
completely describes the Purchase Money Trust Deed which Mr. Harrington signed in favor of 
Mrs. Peterson. As explained more fully below, Defendants contend that the language of the 
Purchase Money Trust Deed was sufficient in and of itself to secure the monies advanced under 
the December 8, 1992 Agreement. However, the language from paragraph 8 of that 
December 8, 1992 Agreement makes it clear that the parties to the December 8 Agreement, at 
the time of its execution, intended and expressly provided that the provisions of that Agreement 
also be secured by the Purchase Money Deed of Trust. No new Promissory Note or other 
document was necessary to accomplish said result. 
Defendants next object to the characterization of certain aspects of the understanding 
reached by the parties in February of 1993, as set forth in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' claimed 
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statement of undisputed facts. In response to further requests from Mr. Harrington for 
additional funds to complete construction, Mrs. Peterson agreed to provide them under the same 
terms as those stated in the December 8, 1992 Agreement. Mr. Harrington's letter of 
February 18, 1993, which nowhere mentions HPI, was unsolicited, and only incompletely 
addresses the understanding then reached by the parties, seemed to Mrs. Peterson to be correct 
to the extent the Agreement was covered, and Mrs. Peterson, after receiving it, took no further 
action to respond thereto, except to advance additional funds as she then believed she needed to 
do to protect her interests in the collateral which secured her original promissory note from 
Mr. Harrington. Peterson's Supplemental Affidavit at ^ 23. 
Defendants object to the unsupported conclusion in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' purported 
undisputed facts, that no other document evidenced the February 1993 agreement of the parties. 
All of the checks signed by Mrs. Peterson advancing further funds in 1993 are additional 
documents reflecting and memorializing the agreement made by the parties in February, 1993 
for Peterson to loan additional funds which totaled a principal of $70,076.44. Peterson's 
Supplemental Affidavit at S 24, and Exhibit "R" thereto. 
Defendants further object to the statements of Plaintiffs in their paragraphs 11 and 12 of 
their claimed statement of purported undisputed facts, wherein Plaintiffs erroneously claimed that 
Mr. Harrington never agreed in any document that any monies loaned in connection with the 
February 18, 1993 letter were secured by the Purchase Money Trust Deed. Those monies were 
so secured, according to the provisions of both the Purchase Money Trust Deed itself, and by 
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virtue of the last sentence of the first paragraph of the February 18, 1993 letter, as more fully 
explained below. 
Defendants next object to that part of paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' statement of purported 
undisputed facts asserting that Harrington's acceptance of the dinger's offer was based on a 
prior conversation with Mrs. Peterson. Mr. Harrington accepted the offer of the Clingers on 
December 5, 1993, and then subsequently notified Mrs. Peterson that he had so acted. 
Peterson's Supplemental Affidavit at K 27. 
Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' statement of purported undisputed facts is totally irrelevant 
to this motion of Plaintiffs. It also erroneously suggests that the later subordination agreement 
required some consent of Mr. Harrington, which it did not, to be effective, as explained in the 
Memorandum of Defendants dated the 6th day of September, 1995, at pages 26-28. Moreover, 
the original agreement to subordinate the Purchase Money Trust Deed to the trust deed 
Harringtons gave Guardian State Bank was only initially intended to be for a period of nine 
months. See Purchase Money Trust Deed Note, evidenced by Exhibit HC,f to First Affidavit of 
Mrs. Peterson. 
Defendants next object to paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' statement of purported undisputed 
facts, insofar as it erroneously states that the supposed payoff amount of $251,897.32 was a 
figure supplied by Mrs. Peterson, which it was not, and insofar as Plaintiffs claim that amount 
contains the entirety of the 1993 advances, which advances were not all included in that amount. 
See Peterson Supplemental Affidavit at Ws 24, 30 and 31. 
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Again, paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Statement of Purported Undisputed Facts is entirely 
irrelevant to their present motion since there never was any kind of a joint venture arrangement 
between Mr. Harrington and Mrs. Peterson. See Peterson Affidavit at ^ 52, and Peterson 
Supplemental Affidavit at 5 17. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The 1993 Advances by Mrs. Peterson Were Secured by Express 
Provisions of the Purchase Money Trust Deed. Those Advances 
Were Not New or Additional Loans of a Character Unrelated to 
the Original Transaction and Therefore Are Not Governed 
by the Language Relied Upon by Plaintiffs. 
The Purchase Money Trust Deed, at the top of its page 2, lists four general categories 
of items that are secured by that Trust Deed, as quoted above. Plaintiffs focus only on the third 
of those four categories, and totally ignore all the remaining categories as though they did not 
exist. To support their desired outcome, Plaintiffs isolate the language of that third category and 
take it out of context, pretending that the other provisions do not exist. Only by doing so can 
it be made to appear, improperly, that the 1993 advances were "additional loans" of the type 
intended to be covered by that third category. 
When one views all four of the categories together and in context, as they were meant 
to be, it becomes clear that the third category addresses only new subsequent loans which are 
unrelated and have nothing to do with the original amount secured by the Trust Deed. As thus 
properly understood, it makes good sense that such new loans should not be secured by the 
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original Trust Deed unless there is a new promissory note which expressly recites that it also 
is secured by that original Trust Deed. 
By contrast, categories one, two and four, addressing other amounts which are all secured 
by the original Deed of Trust, without the necessity of new promissory notes referring to the 
Trust Deed, comprise obligations which do relate and are tied to the original transaction. 
Because Mrs. Peterson's later advances related to the purpose of the original transaction, and 
fit one or more of the other three categories, they require no new promissory or other writing 
to be secured by the Purchase Money Trust Deed. 
Category one is the amount originally secured, but also extends to and includes 
"modifications" of the original note. Mrs. Peterson's later advances are properly viewed as such 
a modification. 
The second category of items secured by the original Trust Deed relates to the 
performance of each of the provisions of the Trust Deed which the Trustor, Harrington, agreed 
to perform. Among other such provisions, Harrington agreed in paragraph one of the following 
section "to complete . . . any building which may be constructed" on the property secured by 
the Trust Deed. Further in that same paragraph, Harrington agreed "to pursue [construction of 
improvements on the subject property] with reasonable diligence/to completion . . . ." Because 
Mrs. Peterson's advances fulfilled the performance of Harrington's obligations, these advances 
are also secured by the Purchase Money Trust Deed under this second category. 
The fourth category of items secured by the Trust Deed is "the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant" to the terms of the Trust Deed, with 
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interest thereon. Paragraph 7 of the following section of the Trust Deed expressly authorizes 
Mrs. Peterson to take such action as she "may deem necessary to protect the security" of the 
Trust Deed, including the expending of "whatever amounts in [her] absolute discretion [she] may 
deem necessary," whenever Harrington failed to do any act which he obligated himself in the 
Trust Deed to take. Seeing that construction remained incomplete when Harrington exhausted 
his own resources, it was entirely reasonable for Mrs. Peterson to deem it necessary to protect 
her security by making new advances, to complete that construction. 
Finally, paragraph 8, at the bottom of page 2 of the Trust Deed, expressly obligated 
Harrington to repay "all sums expended [under the Trust Deed] by the Beneficiary," and further 
provided that said repayment was secured by the Trust Deed. 
That clearly was the intention of Mrs. Peterson. Having naturally become apprehensive 
about whether a premature sale of the property in its distressed condition, before construction 
was substantially completed, would pay off the construction loan to which the Purchase Money 
Trust Deed had temporarily been subordinated, and still leave enough to pay the obligation 
owing to her, (1st Affidavit of Mrs. Peterson at K 21) she reacted in the way that any junior 
lender with the ability would: she advanced further sums to complete construction, improve the 
likelihood that the maximum market value of the subject property could be realized by sale, and 
thereby sought to protect the security of the property which secured the obligations owing to her. 
Had she ever believed that those advances would not have been thus secured by the subject 
property, she had no reason to make those later advances. According to her Supplemental 
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Affidavit, she would not have advanced those additional monies unless she believed them secured 
by the property. Supplemental Affidavit of Mrs. Peterson at K 23. 
That reasonable understanding and expectation of Mrs. Peterson is fully supported by the 
language of the Purchase Money Deed of Trust. 
The express language described above from the Purchase Money Trust Deed signed by 
Mr. Harrington clearly was adequate, without any further writing of any kind, to cause all sums 
which Mrs. Peterson advanced to complete construction of the home on the subject property to 
be secured by that property, by virtue of the quoted provisions of the Deed of Trust. To 
accomplish that result, it was not even necessary that there be any later writing of any kind. 
Thus, even without the December 8, 1992 Agreement and without the February 18, 1993 letter, 
the sums of money advanced by Mrs. Peterson for the purpose of completing the construction 
of the home on the subject property were all secured by that Purchase Money Trust Deed. 
The only legal necessity for the December 8 Agreement and the February 1993 letter is 
to supply the one item missing from the Purchase Money Deed of Trust: a stated rate of interest 
for the later advances. Paragraph 8 at the bottom of page two of the Purchase Money Trust 
Deed has a blank for an interest rate to be inserted, which was not filled in at the time it was 
signed and recorded. This interest rate was supplied by the lat^r writings. The later writings 
also memorialized the agreements of the parties to this action that the later advances were only 
to be used for purposes of finishing construction on the subject property, not for other purposes. 
Those later writings thereby confirmed that the later advances are within the provisions of the 
first, second and fourth categories of items expressly secured by the Deed of Trust. Plaintiffs' 
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arguments, which entirely overlook and ignore the provisions of the Purchase Money Trust Deed 
quoted above, therefore miss their intended mark. 
IL 
Alternatively, the February 1993 Letter is Sufficient to Cause 
the Advances Described Therein to be Secured. 
Moreover, even if it could be seriously argued, contrary to the clear language of the 
Purchase Money Deed of Trust, that Mrs. Peterson's later advancements required a new writing 
in addition to the Purchase Money Deed of Trust to be secured by it, Plaintiffs have 
misconstrued the February 8, 1993 letter. An examination of that letter shows it should properly 
be viewed as the equivalent of both a promissory note and a grant of a security interest. 
In relevant part, it recites that it confirms an agreement of Mr. Harrington, who signed 
the letter, "that any money advanced by vou [Mrs. Peterson] above and beyond the $75,000.00 
(December 8, 1992 Agreement), for the purpose of construction of the home located at 1656 
South Sunset Oaks Drive, will be returned to you with interest consistent with the rate of interest 
in our Agreement dated December 8, 1992 . . .." [Emphasis added]. That language clearly 
conveys an undertaking by Mr. Harrington promising that any such loan by Mrs. Peterson would 
be repaid to her in the manner described in the remainder of the letter. Such an engagement 
meets the requirements necessary to constitute a promissory note. 
The last sentence of the first paragraph states: 'The sale of the house will be the sole 
source of the return of this money." Any lay person reading that sentence would understand that 
language to be the equivalent of a grant of a security interest in the property which is the subject 
of the Deed of Trust, and was so understood by Mrs. Peterson. Merely because more traditional 
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language typically used by lawyers in granting a deed of trust was not used, is no reason to 
construe this language otherwise. 
Accordingly, under any reasonable view of the documents which Mr. Harrington signed, 
there is but one conclusion: the subject property described in the Purchase Money Trust Deed 
secured not only the original purchase money, but also the later advances made by 
Mrs. Peterson. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the Motion of Plaintiffs for 
Partial Summary Judgment and should, instead, declare that all funds advanced by Mrs. Peterson 
were secured by the Purchase Money Deed of Trust and thus enter an Order granting the Cross 
Motion of Defendants on this point. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of September, 1996. 
m 
Mangum 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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